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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5887 
ROCKLAND COUNTY BOCES, 
Employer, 
-and-
BOCES TEACHER AIDES ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT/NEA, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the BOCES Teachers Aides Association, 
NYSUT/AFT/NEA, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
Certification - C-5887 - 2 -
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Teacher Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the BOCES Teacher Aides Association, NYSUT/AFT/NEA, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5874 
TOWN OF SWEDEN, 
Employer. 
ROBERT MCCAURTHY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
DAVID W. LIPPITT, ESQ, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February 25, 2009, the Teamsters Local 118, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Town of Sweden (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time employees working for the Town of Sweden within the 
following job titles: Working Foreman, Heavy Equipment 
Operator, Motor Equipment Operator, Laborer and Automotive 
Mechanic. 
Excluded: All other employees or positions. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on September 11, 
2009, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
^ < < (2. 
Sheila S. Cole' Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, RIVERHEAD 
TOWN BARGAINING UNIT, SUFFOLK LOCAL 852, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26552 
-and-
TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
LAMB & BARNOSKY (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN AND ALYSON 
MATHEWS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Riverhead Town Bargaining Unit, 
Suffolk Local 852 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the Town of Riverhead (Town) 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally transferred certain unit duties of providing care for and interacting with dogs 
in the Town's animal shelter to volunteers and when it unilaterally transferred other unit 
duties in the animal shelter to police personnel. 
Case No. U-26552 -2-
Following a three-day hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge.1 
The ALJ concluded that the Town had a long-term uninterrupted past practice of 
utilizing volunteers to interact with dogs in the animal shelter and to assist in canine 
adoption.2 In addition, the ALJ determined that the transfer of the other duties to police 
personnel constitutes a change in qualifications, and that the Town's interests in 
transferring the duties outweigh the interests of the unit employees. 
EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA asserts, in its exceptions, that the ALJ erred in finding that the Town had 
an uninterrupted practice of utilizing volunteers for interacting with dogs in the animal 
shelter and in assisting with canine adoption. According to CSEA, there was a 13-
month interruption in the Town's practice prior to the resumption of the use of volunteers 
in the animal shelter in 2006. In addition, CSEA excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that 
the transfer of unit work from civilians to police personnel requires the application of a 
balancing test between the respective interests of the parties and that the Town's 
interests outweigh those of the unit. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
CSEA is the recognized representative of a unit of Town employees including 
individuals holding the titles of Animal Control Officer I, Animal Control Officer II and 
Kennel Attendant, who work in the Town's animal shelter. 
1
 41 PERB U4534 (2008). 
2
 Although volunteers at the shelter also perform tasks related to felines, CSEA's 
charge is limited to challenging the Town's alleged change in the use of volunteers 
for the care and adoption of dogs. 
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The duties of Kennel Attendant include maintaining the animal shelter and 
interacting with dogs housed at the shelter for the purpose of enhancing the probability 
of adoption over an alternative fate through euthanasia. Such interactions include 
feeding, walking, playing and brushing the dogs. In addition, a Kennel Attendant is 
responsible for assisting with canine adoptions. 
Animal Control Officers I and II are responsible for, inter alia, enforcing the 
Town's animal control ordinances and regulations, patrolling the Town, issuing warnings 
and summons for animal control violations, and investigating complaints about stray 
animals and animal bites. 
In addition, the Animal Control Officer II is responsible for the administration of 
the shelter. These administrative duties include: preparing the budget; paying the bills; 
selecting the veterinarian; requesting equipment; and determining which dogs to 
euthanize. Animal Control Officer II Louis Coronesi (Coronesi) performed these 
administrative duties exclusively for four years prior to January, 2006, when the Town 
transferred the supervision of the shelter from the sanitation department to the police 
department. As a result of the reassignment of those duties, unit positions have not 
been abolished, and the compensation and benefits of unit employees have remained 
the same. 
In 1996, the Town Board enacted a resolution creating the Riverhead Shelter 
Advisory Group, which included private citizens wanting to assist in the care of animals 
housed in the shelter and facilitating their adoption.3 For the period commencing with 
the passage of the 1996 resolution through December 2004, volunteers worked in the 
3
 Respondent Exhibit 1. 
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shelter alongside Kennel Assistants. During this eight year period, volunteers at the 
shelter have included members of animal rights organizations, private citizens and 
school children. Volunteers fed, walked, trained, played with and brushed the dogs. 
Volunteers performed other tasks, as well, aimed at assisting with canine adoptions. 
Those additional tasks included taking photographs of dogs and posting them on the 
internet to advertise their availability for adoption. 
In 2002, the Town issued a form listing ten written rules of prohibited conduct by 
volunteers working at the animal shelter. Each volunteer was required to sign the form 
and comply with the rules. If a volunteer refused to sign the form or repeatedly violated 
the rules, he or she would be barred from continuing to participate in the shelter 
volunteer program.4 In December 2004, the Town banished long-time volunteer Linda 
Mosca (Mosca) from continuing to be a volunteer at the animal shelter as the result of 
her violations of the rules.5 Other long-term volunteers, Connie Farr and Susan Eaton, 
were not subjected to a similar Town ban and they continued to visit the shelter in 2005 
to interact with the dogs and to assist with adoptions. 
In April 2005, the Town Board passed a new resolution and reappointed the 
Riverhead Animal Control Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee), which included 
Town Board member Rose Sanders, Animal Control Officer John Reeve and members 
of the public. The resolution authorized the Advisory Committee to advise the Town 
Board on various issues including procedures for adoption and euthanasia.6 The 
4
 Respondent Exhibit 6. 
5
 Apparently, a prior ban imposed on Ms. Mosca in 2002 had been lifted by the 
Town. 
6
 Respondent Exhibit 2. 
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following month, the Advisory Committee met to discuss the Town's euthanasia policy 
and the applicable rules for volunteers at the animal shelter.7 After receiving comments 
from Coronesi, proposed amendments to the shelter's policies and procedures, 
including those applicable to volunteers, were circulated.8 In November 2005, the Town 
Board enacted a resolution modifying various animal shelter policies. Among those 
changes were modifications to the rules for animal shelter volunteers, a new volunteer 
application form and a new volunteer agreement.9 The duties performed by volunteers 
at the animal shelter have not changed following the Town's implementation of the 2005 
policy changes. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the framework established in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 
(Niagara Frontier),10 there are two essential questions that must be determined when 
deciding whether the transfer of unit work violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: a) was the 
work at-issue exclusively performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to 
have become binding; and b) was the work assigned to non-unit personnel substantially 
similar to that exclusive unit work. If both these questions are answered in the 
affirmative, we will find a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act unless there is a significant 
change in job qualifications. When there is a significant change in job qualifications, 
7
 Respondent Exhibit 7. 
8
 Respondent Exhibit 8. 
9
 Joint Exhibit 2. 
10
 18 PERB H3083 (1985). 
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however, we must balance the respective interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees to determine whether §209-a.1(d) of the Act has been violated.11 
The application of past practice analysis for determining whether the work has 
been performed exclusively by bargaining unit members in transfer of unit work cases 
was reaffirmed in Manhasset Union Free School District.^2 The applicable test for 
finding an enforceable past practice under the Act is whether the "practice was 
unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the 
circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees 
that the [practice] would continue."13 
In the present case, we reject CSEA's contention that it presented sufficient 
evidence to reestablish exclusivity over the care and adoption of dogs in the animal 
shelter during the December 2004-January 2006 period when Mosca was banned from 
the shelter. In support of its argument, CSEA relies on City of Rochester,™ where we 
found a violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when an employer unilaterally transferred 
work to nonunit personnel despite a 13-month past practice of exclusively assigning 
police officers to perform that work. 
11
 Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, supra, note 10. County of Westchester, 42 PERB 
H3025 (2009). 
12
 41 PERB H3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch 
Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB H7004 (3d Dept 
2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB H3016 (2009). 
13
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB 1J3012, at 3046-3047(2007) (quoting 
from County of Nassau, 24 PERB P029 [1991]), on remand, 42 PERB 1J4527 
(2009). 
14
 21 PERB 1J3040 (1988), confd, City of Rochester v New York State Pub Empl 
Rel Bd, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB fl7035 (4th Dept 1989). 
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Based upon the facts and circumstances in the present case, we conclude that 
CSEA failed to demonstrate an unequivocal Town practice during the period of 
December 2004-January 2006 to create a reasonable expectation among unit 
employees that volunteers would no longer be permitted to perform the at-issue work in 
the animal shelter. The evidence establishes that during the relevant period, the Town 
did not take any measures to prohibit or limit volunteers, other than Mosca, from 
interacting with the dogs in the shelter or assisting with adoptions. The Town's 
relatively informal rules and procedures for volunteers remained in effect at all times 
during that period. In addition, the evidence establishes a clear Town intention, known 
to unit members, to continue the eight-year practice of permitting volunteers to work at 
the animal shelter but under more restrictive regulations. 
We are also not persuaded by CSEA's contention that the visits by Farr and 
Eaton to the animal shelter, following Mosca's banishment, were in their role as 
consumers rather than volunteers. This purported distinction is belied by the informality 
of the Town's volunteer policy and the fact that the activities of Farr and Eaton during 
the applicable period continued to include interacting with the dogs and assisting in 
adoptions. 
Finally, we turn to CSEA's exceptions with respect to the reassignment of the 
administrative duties of the Animal Control Officer II to police officers. 
In City of Newburgh,^5 we held that the transfer of unit work performed by animal 
control officers to police officers constitutes a perse significant change in qualifications 
15
 31 PERB 1J3017 (1998), on remand, 31 PERB 1J4621 (1998), affd, 32 PERB 
1J3015 (1999), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 273 
AD2d 626, 33 PERB 1J7009 (3d Dept 2000). 
Case No. U-26552 -8-
and, therefore, results in a change in the nature and level of services.16 Therefore, 
contrary to CSEA's argument, the balancing test mandated by Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority17 is applicable. 
Following our review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that interests 
of the Town in transferring the administrative duties outweigh those of CSEA unit 
members. The Town's managerial decision to place the animal shelter under the 
jurisdiction of the police department resulted in the reassignment of various duties, 
previously performed by the Animal Control Officer II, to police personnel. The transfer 
of this work did not result in any loss of employment or benefits for unit members. 
Therefore, we conclude that the Town did not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally transferred the administrative responsibilities of the Animal Control Officer II 
to police personnel. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.18 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ " Sheila S. Cole, Member 
16
 See also, Fairview Fire Dist, 29 PERB 1J3042 (1996). Based upon the arguments 
presented by CSEA in this case, we have no reason to deviate from or reconsider 
our prior holdings. 
17
 Supra, note 10. 
18
 Chairman Lefkowitz took no part. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner/I ntervenor, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-5760 
SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (ERIC J. LARUFFA of counsel), for 
Petitioner/Intervenor 
INGERMAN SMITH, LLP . (JONATHAN HEIDELBERGER of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Sachem Central School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a petition filed 
by United Public Service Employees Union (UPSEU), as amended, placing the title of 
School Communication Aide (SCA) into the UPSEU Clerical Unit (Clerical Unit).1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that the 
Clerical Unit is the most appropriate unit to place the SCA title rather than the Sachem 
142 PERB H4006 (2009). 
Case No. C-5760 
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Central Teachers' Association-Teacher Aide Unit, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Aide Unit).2 
In support of its exceptions, the District claims that the ALJ misapplied applicable 
precedent and misconstrued the facts. UPSEU supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the District and UPSEU, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The District is composed of a dozen elementary schools, four middle schools 
and two high schools. There are eight existing collective bargaining units, including the 
Aide Unit and the Clerical Unit, which represents District employees in various titles. 
Prior to September 2006, the District employed individuals holding an in-house 
title interchangeably referred to as Computer Aide or Technology Aide (hereinafter 
Technology Aide). The actual civil service classification for the position, however, was 
Elementary School Classroom Aide. Since 1999, employees in the in-house title were a 
part of the Aide Unit along with employees in the positions of School Teacher Aide and 
Special Education Aide. All three Aide positions are in the noncompetitive class. 
The Clerical Unit is composed of all 12-month and ten-month clerical staff 
employed by the District including Clerk-Typists, Stenographers and ten-month 
Attendance Aides. All positions in the Clerical Unit are in the competitive class and, 
therefore, subject to a probationary period. 
2
 Following issuance of a notice of the pendency of the representation petition, the 
Teacher Aide Unit did not seek to intervene pursuant to §212 of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). 
Case No. C-5760 
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According to the testimony of Patricia Bertolone (Bertolone), there has been a 
conflict within the Teacher Aide Unit since the placement of Technology Aides in that 
unit. Bertolone testified that this conflict stemmed from differences in the job 
responsibilities between Technology Aides and the other Aide positions resulting in a 
different preference with respect to seeking seniority benefits during negotiations. 
In early 2006, the District was notified by the Suffolk County Civil Service 
Commission (Commission) that the Technology Aide title was not appropriate for the 
duties being performed by employees in that title. Thereafter, the Commission 
reclassified the Technology Aide position to SCA, a competitive class position. The 
minimum qualifications for the SCA position include a high school diploma or its 
equivalent along with one year of experience in the operation and maintenance of 
computers and audio-visual equipment. 
On September 7, 2006, the District abolished the Technology Aide title and 
created the SCA position. At the same time, each incumbent in the Technology Aide 
title was appointed provisionally to the SCA position pending the creation of an eligibility 
list. Eventually, all but one of the Technology Aides were permanently appointed as 
SCAs.3 
It is undisputed that employees in the SCA position continue to perform the 
same duties they performed as Technology Aides: maintaining, operating and 
coordinating the use of the District's computers, smart boards, and audio-visual 
3
 One former Technology Aide was appointed as a Special Education Aide after failing 
the SCA examination. 
Case No. C-5760 
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equipment. In addition, their respective work locations have not changed: SCAs are 
assigned to different District schools. Some are assigned to a school library; others 
have offices in a library or hallway. In performing their duties, SCAs interact with 
teachers and students for purposes of delivering, setting up and repairing equipment, 
installing software, and resolving technical problems. They also work closely with a 
BOCES staff developer who assists teachers and students with projects. In addition, 
they interact with all District staff with respect to supplies for computers and other 
equipment. 
Special Education Aides and School Teacher Aides, like SCAs, have 
responsibilities in the operation of computers, audio-visual equipment and assistive 
technological devices but only in the classroom. A minimum qualification for both SCAs 
and Special Education Aides is four years of high school or its equivalent.4 While SCAs 
interact with clerical staff with respect to supplies and computer hardware problems, 
they are not responsible for the maintenance and operation of the particular 
administrative software, Pentamation, utilized by the clerical staff.5 
After their appointment, the wages, benefits and working conditions of SCAs 
have remained similar to the remaining titles in the Aide Unit: a ten-month work year; a 
six and a half hour work day; a 2.5% annual salary increase; seven sick days and two 
personal days per year. Unlike Classroom Aides and Special Education Aides, 
4
 A high school diploma or its equivalent is only preferred for Special Education Aides. 
5
 Pentamation software problems are handled by Matt Demaio, a District official with 
responsibilities related to technology. 
Case No. C-5760 
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however, the annual SCA salary was initially set by the District at $16,000 and SCAs 
are not entitled to the extra holidays and longevity payments negotiated in the Aides 
Unit's agreement.6 
In general, Clerical Unit employees receive significantly better wages and 
benefits, such as holidays and greater personal and sick leave, than those received by 
SCAs.7 All employees in the Clerical Unit, with the exception of the 10 Attendance 
Aides, work 12 months a year and 7.74 hours per day when school is in session. 
Attendance Aides work 191 days per year and 6.5 hours per day. They are responsible 
for monitoring student attendance information, contacting the homes of absent 
students, and creating and distributing an absentee list to the teachers. 
DISCUSSION 
When determining a unit placement petition, the most important of the criteria set 
forth in §207.1 of the Act is the community of interest criterion.8 Among the factors to be 
considered in determining whether a community of interest exists are similarities in 
terms and conditions of employment, shared duties and responsibilities, qualifications, 
common work location and whether a conflict of interest exists between the members of 
6
 Prior to the creation of SCA by the District, the Aide Unit requested voluntary 
recognition to place the new position in its unit. Respondent Exhibit 2. Subsequently, 
the request was withdrawn and a memorandum of agreement was reached for a 
successor agreement, which did not add SCA to the Aide Unit. Transcript,172-173; 
Joint Exhibit 6. 
7
 However, the value of the life insurance benefit for SCAs is substantially greater, and 
unlike Clerical Unit employees, SCAs do not contribute to insurance premiums. 
8
 Regional Transit Service, Inc., 39 PERB 1J3027 (2006). 
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the proposed unit.9 
Based upon the facts and circumstances in the present case, we conclude that 
the ALJ erred in placing the SCAs in the Clerical Unit rather than the Aide Unit. The 
evidence demonstrates that SCAs, along with Teacher Aide and Special Education 
Aides, are responsible for the operation of computers, smart boards, and audio-visual 
equipment in the classroom. While we agree with the ALJ's conclusion that SCAs 
duties are not instructional in nature, like Teacher Aides and Special Education Aides, 
SCAs do perform an essential role in ensuring the proper operation and maintenance.of 
the technologically-based pedagogical classroom tools. In performing those duties, they 
interact with teachers and students, as well as Teacher Aides and Special Education 
Aides. Unlike the general support provided by Clerical Unit employees, the role of SCAs 
is more directly connected to the District's pedagogical mission. Although SCAs interact 
with clerical staff and other District staff with respect to supplies, they are not 
responsible for resolving the particular software problems faced by clerical staff. 
Furthermore, unlike Attendance Aides, SCAs are not responsible for monitoring student 
attendance. 
In addition, as the ALJ correctly found, the terms and conditions of employment 
of SCAs, which were unilaterally imposed by the District, are more similar to Teacher 
Aides and Special Education Aides than Clerical Unit employees. While the minimum 
qualifications and civil service status of SCAs differ from the remaining titles in the Aide 
9
 See, East Ramapo Cent Sen Dist, 11 PERB 1J3075 (1978); Somers Cent Sch Dist, 12 
PERB 1J3068 (1979); Monroe #1 BOCES, 39 PERB 1J3024 (2006). 
^ 
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Unit, we do not find such differences, under the facts in the present case, to be 
sufficient to warrant the placement of SCAs into the Clerical Unit.10 
Finally, we consider the question whether there is a reasonable likelihood of 
conflicts if SCAs are placed in the Aide Unit. The record reveals that Technology Aides 
were in the Aide Unit for at least seven years. During this period, a Technology Aide, 
Bertolone, was a member of the negotiations team during at least one round of 
bargaining. While Bertolone testified to differences before and during the period when 
Technology Aides were in the Aide Unit, including differences over a particular seniority 
proposal, we find her testimony to be conclusory in nature and, therefore, insufficient to 
establish a conflict of interest warranting the placement of SCAs into the Clerical Unit.11 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ's decision is reversed and SCAs 
are hereby placed into the Aides Unit. 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
fpU/nd. 
Jerome l_|efkowiiz, Chairman 
f^gyy s« SKy(( ^ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
10
 Wappingers Cen Sch Dist, 28 PERB P037 (1995). 
11
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3011 (2007). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 1070, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-1095 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
EDDIE M. DEMMINGS, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARY J. O'CONNELL of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
JAMES P. WELCH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR LABOR RELATIONS 
(CHRISTINA M.ULLO of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York - Unified Court 
System (UCS) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a unit placement 
Case No. CP-1095 - 2 -
"> and unit clarification petition filed by District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 1070 
(DC 37) seeking to accrete the title of "Secretary to Judge" to its unit.1 Following the 
submission of the case, the ALJ granted the petition by placing the Secretary to Judge title 
into the DC 37 negotiations unit. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, UCS argues that the ALJ erred: 
1. In concluding that individuals holding the title of Secretary to Judge in New York 
City are employed by UCS rather than by the elected Supreme Court Justices who 
personally appoint and supervise them. 
2. In finding a "community of interest" between employees holding the title of Secretary 
to Judge in New York City and the employees in the DC 37 negotiating unit. 
\ 3. In failing to notify the 170 individuals in the title Secretary to Judge of the pendency 
of the petition and to afford them an opportunity to express their preferences 
concerning possible representation by DC 37, and the ALJ's related error in 
concluding that such preferences are irrelevant to the resolution of the instant 
matter; 
4. In finding that DC 37 and UCS might negotiate the "continuation of certain fringe 
benefits" that unrepresented employees holding the title of Secretary to Judge have 
been receiving either from UCS or from the City of New York; 
5. In applying PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) §201.2(b), which permits a unit 
placement and/or clarification petition "at any time" rather than finding it untimely 
1
 41 PERB 1J4005 (2008). The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) intervened before the ALJ but has not filed a response to the 
j exceptions. 
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under a superseded Rule that had provided that only newly-created or substantially 
altered positions could be considered for unit placement and/or clarification. 
DISCUSSION2 
Having reviewed the record and the positions of the parties, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision. Our reasons respond to the exceptions in the order in which they were 
presented by UCS in its brief. 
It is clear from the language of the Judiciary Law, and relevant precedent, that 
secretaries personally appointed by Judges are employees of UCS.3 Pursuant to the State 
Constitution, Article VI, §28(B) & (C), in 1978, the Legislature enacted legislation modifying 
the administration of the courts.4 Pursuant to Judiciary Law §§211 and 212, the judicial 
administration of the courts is assigned to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and 
responsibility for supervising the administration of the courts is assigned to the Chief 
Administrator of the Courts, on behalf of the Chief Judge. Subdivision 1 (e) of Judiciary 
Law §212 specifies that the Chief Administrator shall: "[a]ct as 'chief executive officer' and 
exercise the functions, powers and duties of a 'public employer' under the provisions of 
article fourteen of the civil service law [the Taylor Law]." In addition, Judiciary Law §36 
states: 
2
 The facts are recited in detail in the decision of the ALJ. We repeat only those facts 
necessary to determine the exceptions. 
3
 Placement of the title Secretary to Judge in the DC 37 negotiating unit would not give DC 
37 a right to negotiate demands concerning job security for such secretaries. State of New 
York-Unified Court System, 26 PERB1J3039 (1993). 
4
 L 1978, c 156. 
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1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, each justice 
of the supreme court may appoint and at pleasure 
remove one law clerk and one secretary, subject to the 
standards and administrative policies promulgated 
pursuant to section twenty-eight of article six of the 
constitution. 
2. Should a judge or justice of the unified court system 
cease to hold office for any reason other than expiration 
of his term, his personal assistants shall continue in office 
until a successor is appointed or elected to fill such 
vacancy. Until such vacancy is filled, the chief 
administrator of the courts shall determine the functions 
to be performed by such personal assistants. 
For Taylor Law purposes, there is a similarity in the administrative structure of the 
State Judiciary and the State Executive Branch. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals 
is the chief executive officer of the State's Judicial Branch, just as the Governor is the chief 
executive officer for the State's Executive Branch.5 The Chief Administrator functions as 
the agent of the Chief Judge, to the extent that he acts as the chief executive officer of 
UCS for Taylor Law purposes. Similarly, the Governor's Office of Employee Relations is 
the agent of the Governor for purposes of fulfilling the Taylor Law responsibilities of the 
State of New York.6 
Within the Executive Branch there are many departments, agencies, commissions 
and bodies, and the head of each such entity is the appointing authority with the power to 
appoint and terminate staff.7 Nevertheless, Executive Branch negotiating units include 
5
 See, Hudson Valley Dist Council of Carpenters v State of New York, Dept of Corr Servs, 
152 AD2d 105 (3d Dept 1989). 
6
 ld: 
7
 See, Civil Service Law §2.8. 
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employees who work for many different appointing authorities. Similarly, while a Supreme 
Court Justice is the appointing authority for a Secretary to Judge, pursuant to Judiciary 
Law §36, UCS is the employer for those non-judicial employees for purposes of the Taylor 
Law.9 
UCS's second exception argues that even if employees in the title of Secretary to 
Judge are its employees, differences between their terms and conditions of employment 
and those of other UCS secretaries are sufficient to preclude their placement in a single 
unit. We reject this argument of UCS, fully endorsing the factual and legal analysis of the 
ALJ.10 The ALJ's decision is fully supported by our precedent dating back to Board of 
Education, St. Lawrence Central School District No. 7,11 where we stated that §207.1(c) of 
the Taylor Law Act "requires the designation of as small a number of units as possible" 
consistent with the likelihood of effective negotiations, which means the absence of the 
a
 State of New York, 1 PERB 1J399.85 (1968), reversed in part but affirmed in pertinent 
part, CSEA v Helsby, 24 AD2d 993 (3d Dept 1969), 2 PERB 1J7005, affd, 32 AD2d 131, 2 
PERB U7007 (3d Dept 1969), affd, 25 NY2d 842, 2 PERB 1J7013 (1969). Cf. Montero v 
/_t/m, 68NY2d253(1986). 
9
 See, State of New York-Unified Court System, supra note 3. In reaching the conclusion 
that a Secretary to Judge is an employee of UCS, we give no weight to the representation 
of secretaries to judges by CSEA. Prior to April 1, 1977, counties funded the operations of 
State Supreme Courts, including the compensation of non-judicial employees, and the 
counties were deemed to be the employers of such employees. This was terminated by 
L1976, c 966. At that time, secretaries to judges were included in the county negotiating 
units represented by CSEA. That is because CSEA had represented them as county 
employees before April 1, 1977. And when their employment was transferred to UCS, it 
was prevented by Judiciary Law §39.7 from seeking to alter the negotiating unit. 
10
 Supra note 1, 41 PERB 1J4005 at pp. 4030^4032. 
112PERBP043(1969). 
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likelihood of a meaningful conflict of interest.12 We also find, as did the ALJ, that the 
difference in benefits received by incumbents in the title Secretary to Judge and other 
secretaries among the DC 37 unit employees suggests very little likelihood of a conflict of 
interest. 
UCS's third exception asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that, except where the 
majority status of an employee organization must be ascertained, employee preference 
need not be considered. Again, we agree with the ALJ's determination. We reject UCS's 
third exception because it is not supported by a legal argument or by record evidence. 
UCS's brief does not reference any relevant language of the Taylor Law; neither 
does it cite to any Board or court precedent to support its argument. Sections 202 and 
207.2 of the Taylor Law provide that employee choice is determinative as to whether a 
particular employee organization shall be certified but is silent as to such choice having a 
role in the definition of an appropriate negotiating unit. That part of the representation 
process is set forth in §207.1 of the Taylor Law, which prescribes three criteria none of 
which contemplates consideration of employee choice.13 The first of these criteria is that 
there must be a community of interest among unit employees, which can be defeated by a 
conflict of interest among them as would preclude meaningful negotiations.14 The second 
criterion is that there be a public employer that can negotiate with the certified employee 
organization with respect to the terms and conditions of employment of all the employees 
12
 Supra note 15,2 PERB 1J3043 at 3333-3334. 
13
 See, Greater Southern TierBOCES, 41 PERB fl4002, n 12 (2008), and the cases cited 
by the ALJ therein. 
14
 Board of Educ, St. Lawrence Cent Sch Dist No. 1, supra note 11. 
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represented in such unit; we have interpreted that criterion to preclude multi-employer 
units.15 The third criterion is that the unit be "compatible with the joint responsibilities of 
the public employer and the public employees to serve the public." Reiterating what we 
said in rejecting the second exception herein, this standard requires that there should be 
the fewest units of employees of a single employer as would be consistent with the first 
standard, the absence of a conflict of interest.16 
In its fourth exception, UCS appears to have misapprehended the relevant 
conclusion of the ALJ. He did not find that DC 37 could negotiate the continuation of 
benefits provided by the New York City Management Fund (Fund). As the Fund would, 
under the Taylor Law, not be the employer of employees in the title of Secretary to Judge, 
DC 37 could not negotiate with it. However, DC 37 would be entitled to negotiate with 
UCS with respect to benefits. This was understood by the ALJ when he wrote that to the 
extent that some secretaries may lose some benefits, such losses would not have an 
overall negative impact upon them because of offsetting benefits that would become 
available to them by reason of becoming represented by DC 37. He then added that a . 
UCS witness had testified that in the past, DC 37 had negotiated successfully with UCS to 
provide benefits to substitute for those provided by the Fund. Negotiation demands 
submitted by DC 37 to UCS for most fringe benefits17 on behalf of employees who are 
15
 See, County of Putnam, 33 PERB P001 (2000). Cf. County of Orange and Sheriff of 
County of Orange, 14 PERB1J3012 (1981). 
16
 Board ofEduc, St. Lawrence Cent Sch Dist No 1, supra note 11. 
17
 But not for pension-related benefits. 
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accreted to its negotiating unit would be mandatory subjects of negotiation.18 While the 
record evidence is that DC 37 had been successful in such negotiations in the past, the 
ALJ did not state that they would be successful in future negotiations. Accordingly, the 
fourth exception is rejected. 
UCS's final exception is that DC 37's petition herein is untimely because the ALJ 
should not have applied §201.2(b) of our Rules as amended in 1996, which permits the filing 
by public employers and recognized or certified employee organizations of unit clarification or 
placement petitions "at any time". Instead, it argues, he should have applied our pre-1996 
Rule which only authorized unit placement and unit clarification petitions for new or 
substantially altered positions. 
We reject this exception. The rule that UCS would have us apply was superseded 
more than ten years before the petition herein was filed. 
Having rejected each of UCS's exceptions, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, and 
we order that the title of Secretary to Judge be placed in the DC 37 unit. 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Sections 203 and 201.4 of the Act. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the New York State Law 
Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Greene County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association, Local 2790G (Council 82) to a decision by the Assistant Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) on an improper 
practice charge filed by Council 82 alleging that the County of Greene and the Sheriff of 
Greene County (joint employer) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). In her decision, the Assistant Director concluded that the charge 
alleged only that the joint employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally 
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changing the amount of the co-payment cost for a doctor office visit. The Assistant 
Director dismissed that allegation concluding that the joint employer had met its burden 
of demonstrating its duty satisfaction defense.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, Council 82 asserts that the Assistant Director misconstrued the 
charge by concluding that it is limited to alleging a unilateral change in the amount of 
the co-payments. According to Council 82, the charge contains a separate and distinct 
allegation that the joint .employer violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it failed 
to disclose to Council 82, during negotiations, that the co-payments would increase if 
Council 82 agreed to certain health insurance concessions proposed by the joint 
employer. In addition, Council 82 excepts to the Assistant Director's conclusion that the 
joint employer satisfied its duty to negotiate the subject of co-payments. The joint 
employer supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the Assistant Director's decision. 
FACTS 
Council 82 is the recognized representative of a collective bargaining unit of 
individuals employed by the joint employer holding full-time positions of Deputy Sheriffs 
(criminal) and Deputy Sheriff Sergeants (criminal). Following the expiration of the 
January 1, 2003-December 31, 2005 collectively negotiated agreement (agreement), 
the parties' commenced negotiations for a successor agreement through the exchange 
1
 42 PERB H4513(2009). 
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of negotiation proposals on January 24, 2006. The joint employer submitted 13 
proposals including two concerning health benefits. In proposal No. 2, it sought to 
amend Article 9 of the expired agreement to provide that changes to co-payments for 
doctor visits be added to the health insurance issues subject to the review and 
recommendations of a labor-management Health Insurance Committee (Committee).2 
Proposal No. 3 sought two health benefit concessions from Council 82: a) the 
elimination of an option permitting the carrying over of excess deductible remaining to a 
unit employee's credit; and b) lowering the maximum eligibility age for dependent 
children in college. 
At the hearing before the Assistant Director, Council 82 representative Richard 
Stevens (Stevens) testified that during the negotiations he specifically asked the joint 
employer's representatives what would be the economic consequences of its health 
benefit proposals.3 Greene County Director of Personnel Audrey G. Adrezin (Adrezin) 
testified, however, that she did not recall Council 82 inquiring whether there would be 
other related changes resulting if it agreed to the proposed health benefit concessions.4 
However, it is undisputed that despite the joint employer's awareness that the proposed 
concessions would result in the co-payment cost for a doctor office visit to increase from 
$10 to $15, it did not disclose this information to Council 82 during the negotiations. 
2
 Under the expired agreement, the Committee was authorized to review and make 
recommendations with respect to prescription drugs, insurance co-payments and/or 
deductibles. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 69-70. 
4
 Transcript, p. 36. 
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On March 9, 2006, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
containing modifications to the expired agreement including the joint employer's two 
health benefit proposals.5 The MOA was subsequently ratified and is silent with respect 
to increasing the amount of the co-payment for a doctor office visit. In June, 2006, unit 
members learned, when they received their new health insurance cards, that their co-
payments had been increased to $15 a visit. 
Consistent with the MOA, on November 8, 2006, the parties executed a 
successor agreement for the period January 1, 2006-December 31, 2008.6 Section 
9.2.2 of the successor agreement states, in relevant part that: 
B. The prescription drug co-pay and doctor visit co-pays shall be the 
minimum cost offered by the HMO carrier. If the prescription drug co-
payments and/or doctor visit co-payments increase above the 
minimum level, the additional costs will be the responsibility of the 
employee. 
C. Any change to the prescription drugs, insurance co-pays, doctor visit 
co-pays and/or deductibles will be referred to a Health Insurance 
Committee comprised of three (3) Union and three (3) County people. 
The Committee will review the matter and make a recommendation 
as to how to proceed. If the recommendation of the Committee is not 
accepted, the increase proposed by the carrier will be implemented. 
The implementation of the higher prescription drug co-pay, insurance 
co-payment, doctor visit co-pays or deductible will not be subject to 
the grievance procedure or form the basis for an improper practice 
charge. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with Council 82's exception targeting the Assistant Director's 
determination that the charge did not include an allegation that the joint employer failed 
5
 Charging Party Exhibit No. 1. 
6
 Joint Exhibit No. 1. 
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to negotiate in good faith during the parties' negotiations leading to the successor 
agreement. 
Pursuant to §204.1 (b)(3) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), an improper practice 
charge must contain a clear and concise statement of facts that provides reasonable 
notice of the alleged conduct by the respondent, which the charging party avers 
constitutes a violation of the Act.7 
In the present case, the charge alleges that, during the negotiations, the joint 
employer knew that its proposed health benefit concessions would result in an increase 
in the co-payments paid by unit members and it did not disclose this information to 
Council 82.8 Following our review of the allegations of the charge, we conclude that the 
charge provides reasonable notice to the joint employer that Council 82 is alleging that 
the joint employer engaged in bad faith bargaining by withholding information about the 
complete impact of its proposed health benefit concessions on unit members. 
In reaching our conclusion, we note that both parties understood that the charge 
includes that allegation. This is clear from Council 82's opening statement, the 
evidence presented during the hearing, the arguments made by the joint employer in its 
motion to dismiss and in the parties' respective closing briefs submitted to the Assistant 
Director.9 
7
 CSEA (Dennis), 26 PERB 1J3059 (1993); Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 28 PERB 1J3016 
(1995). 
8
 ALJ Exhibit Nos. 1, lffl3, 4, 5 and 7. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 10-13, 36, 39, 41,46-48, 69-70, 104. See, Charging Party's Closing 
Argument, pp. 9-10; Brief Submitted on Behalf of the County of Greene and Greene 
County Sheriff, pp. 1, 3-6. 
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Therefore, we find that the Assistant Director erred in her interpretation of 
Council 82's charge and remand the case to her for further processing with respect to 
the claim that the joint employer engaged in bad faith negotiations by intentionally 
withholding requested information during negotiations about the adverse economic 
impact of its proposed health benefit concessions. 
Next, we consider Council 82's exceptions challenging the Assistant Director's 
finding that the joint employer demonstrated it satisfied its duty to negotiate under the 
Act over the subject of the change in the amount of the co-payments. 
When parties have negotiated a subject to completion and have entered into an 
agreement with respect to that subject, a respondent has satisfied its duty to negotiate 
under the Act.10 In New York City Transit Authority,^ we reiterated the applicable 
standard for determining a duty satisfaction defense: 
A satisfaction of the duty to negotiate necessitates 
record evidence of facts establishing that the parties 
negotiated an agreement upon terms which are 
reasonably clear on the subject presented to us for 
decision. 
Absent Council 82's allegation in the charge that the joint employer intentionally 
withheld requested information about the economic impact of its health care proposals, 
10
 County of Nassau (Police Department), 31 PERB 1J3064 (1998); State of New York 
(Workers' Compensation Board), 32 PERB fl3076 (1999); County of Columbia, 41 
PERB 1J3023 (2008); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro Systems, Inc., 42 PERB fl3023 
(2009). 
11
 41 PERB 1J3014 (2008); see also, City of Albany, 41 PERB 1J3019 (2008). 
12
 Supra, note 11,41 PERB 1J3014 at 3076 (quoting from Town of Shawangunk, 32 
PERB 113042, at 3095 [1999]), 
Case No. U-27095 -7-
we would have affirmed the Assistant Director's conclusion that §9.2.2 of the parties' 
successor agreement demonstrates that the joint employer satisfied its duty to negotiate 
the subject matter of the unilateral change in co-payments for doctor office visits. 
However, an intentional misrepresentation of material facts by a party during 
negotiations constitutes a separate violation under §209-a.1(d) of the Act.13 Pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act, if it is found that the joint employer deliberately misled Council 82 
in response to its specific inquiry about the consequences of the health care proposals, 
the Board has the authority to order the joint employer to reopen the negotiations at 
Council 82's request. Under these circumstances, we are unable to render a final 
decision on Council 82's exceptions challenging the Assistant Director's determination 
with respect to the duty satisfaction defense. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant Council 82's exceptions, in part, and remand 
the case to the Assistant Director to determine the merits of Council 82's claim that the 
joint employer engaged in bad faith bargaining by intentionally failing to disclose 
information about the increase in the amount of the co-payment for a doctor's office visit 
that would result from it agreeing to the joint employer's health care proposals.14 
13
 County of Rockland, 29 PERB1J3009 (1996), reversed on other grounds, CSEA v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 29 PERB 1J7012 (Sup Ct Albany County 1996) nor. 
See also, State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 25 PERB ' 
113078 (1992), confirmed sub nom. Council 82 v Kinsella, 197 AD2d 341, 27 PERB 
1}7006(3dDept1994). 
14
 Following the Assistant Director's decision on remand, Council 82 may renew its 
exceptions with the Board, if necessary, with respect to the Assistant Director's decision 
sustaining the joint employer's duty satisfaction defense. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the ALJ for further processing of the charge consistent with this 
decision.15 
DATED: October 30, 2009 
Albany, New York 
n 
~7j Jerome LefAowita/Chairman 
Sheila S. (£ole, Member 
15
 Board Member Hite took no part. 
